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Abstract: Since its inception, the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been discussed 
controversely. Data from the OECD and the World Bank 
show that the protectionist effects of the CAP between 
the 1960s and the 1980s were larger than those of its 
national predecessors. Moreover, there is evidence 
that already the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s re-
duced the level of protection and support in the EU, 
that is prior to the MacSharry reform of 1992. 
  
The history of European integration is usually told as a success 
story. Countries that used to fight against each other for cen-
turies decided to cooperate politically as well as economically 
and established supranational institutions. More than half a 
century after its foundation, the European Union forms an um-
brella under which its member states pursue common interests or 
compete peacefully for resources and markets.1 At least for the 
core of the states that joined the European Union before the 
turn of the century, the very idea that neighboring states take 
up arms to resolve conflicts is hardly conceivable. By all po-
litical standards this is indeed a tremendous success. 
 
This historical achievement, however, did not come without 
cost. As numerous states have to coordinate their decision-
making, costly institutions emerged to manage the European Un-
ion. The notorious 'bureaucrats in Brussels', though, cost the 
European taxpayer not more than 0.06 per cent of the combined 
gross national income (GNI) of the EU member states.2 Even if 
some bureaucratic excesses may call for rationalization, the 
EU's political coordination costs are quantitatively negligible. 
 
For an assessment of the true costs of the European Union 
it is not sufficient to consider administration costs alone. A 
more interesting issue is whether the policies pursued by the EU 
caused costs that feasible alternatives would not have had. In 
this respect the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) comes im-
mediately to mind. In the first three decades of the EU it was 
                                                 
1  Throughout this article the term 'European Union' will be used for its 
predecessors as well: EEC - European Economic Community and EC - European 
Community. I would like to thank the German Historical Institute Paris for 
generous funding of this research project and Carine Germond, Fernando 
Guirao, Markus Hofreither, Cathérine Moreddu, Katja Seidel and Stefan 
Tangermann for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and 
Michael Buchner and Valentin Kreilinger for very able research assistance. 
All remaining errors are of course my own responsibility. 
2  Calculated from European Commission, EU Budget 2008: Financial Report, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
2009, pp. 77-83. 
the CAP that received by far most public attention, to an extent 
that the CAP seemed at times to be nearly congruent with EU 
politics. This was mirrored by the EU budget, the expenditure 
side of which was (and still is) dominated by the CAP, with its 
share peaking at 90 per cent in 1970.3  
 
Yet the CAP cost European consumers and taxpayers much more 
than what was visible in the EU budgets. European farmers en-
joyed high protection levels against cheaper imports and even 
received subsidies to export their production surpluses. This 
may be interpreted as a huge redistribution program from the 
non-agricultural sectors to agriculture. In total, however, the 
costs borne by taxpayers and consumers were larger than the 
farmers’ benefits because high prices crowded out consumer de-
mand and the subsidized expansion of European agriculture bound 
labor and capital resources that might have been used more pro-
ductively in other parts of the economy. Hence the CAP was not 
just a zero-sum game. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present first results of a 
larger exercise aimed at estimating the full costs of the CAP, 
thus supplementing historians' EU success stories with the sober 
results of the cost side. Within the EU taxpayers and consumers 
incurred these costs while farmers benefited. Outside the EU the 
CAP was criticized for its protectionist effects. In this paper, 
we are particularly interested in the degree of agricultural 
protection caused by the CAP and its development over the last 
half century. This will allow us to assess the validity of two 
arguments that are often repeated. First, that the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy just continued national agricultural poli-
cies, and second, that the MacSharry reform of 1992 led to a 
substantial reduction of agricultural protection in the EU.4 
 
The empirical backbone of this undertaking are two data-
bases measuring agricultural protection set up by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Bank, respectively. While the World Bank database has not 
yet been exploited for historical research, that of the OECD has 
only very recently been used by economic history research, in a 
pioneering article by Giovanni Federico.5 From a conceptual 
point of view the OECD database is ideal for the purposes pur-
sued here. Its drawback, however, is that it starts only with 
                                                 
3  EAGGF Guarantee Section plus related structural funds, calculated from 
ibid., p. 78. 
4  M. TRACY, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1880-1988, 3rd 
ed., Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1989, p. 362; G. THIEMEYER, The failure 
of the Green Pool and the success of the CAP: long-term structures in 
European agricultural integration in the 1950s and 1960s, in: K.K. PATEL 
(ed.), Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the 
Common Agricultural Policy since 1945, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp. 47-59, 
here pp. 53-54. 
5  G. FEDERICO, Was the CAP the worst agricultural policy of the 20th 
century?, in: PATEL (ed.), op. cit., pp. 257-271.  
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the year 1979 and underwent a fundamental conceptual change for 
the years since 1986. The World Bank database builds on the OECD 
data and goes, for some countries at least, back to 1956. The 
economic concepts underlying these databases are compatible so 
that the two databases combined cover the main member states of 
the EU. 
 
A cautionary remark needs to be made. The findings pre-
sented here are in themselves not sufficient for a normative as-
sessment of the CAP. Apart from the political benefits of the 
CAP – paying for an inefficient supranational policy is cer-
tainly more sensible than to wage war against each other – and 
its non-agricultural economic benefits – to achieve France's 
consent for the Common Market some form of agricultural policy 
coordination was considered a conditio sine qua non in the early 
1960s – it is now widely accepted that certain agricultural ac-
tivities produce positive external effects for which farmers 
should be rewarded. In particular, the preservation of a his-
torically emerged landscape is a public good for which modern 
societies are willing to pay. This argument is not necessarily 
ahistorical. What is described here in sober notions of welfare 
economics may have been felt by politicians and taxpayers of the 
1960s as well, even though it was expressed in terms like 'tra-
dition', 'heritage', etc. In this respect this paper is far from 
pretending to deliver complete data for a normative assessment 
of the CAP – not addressing the benefits, it is just confined to 
the cost side. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we will 
briefly review the development of the CAP from its beginnings to 
the MacSharry reform of 1992, which is usually seen as a turning 
point in the history of the CAP. Section two discusses the OECD 
and World Bank databases and how they are combined for deriving 
the results which are presented in section three. Section four 
concludes. 
 
 
1. Chronology: A Short Economic History of the CAP Up to the 
MacSharry Reform  
 
After World War II the United States wished to establish a new 
order in which European states cooperated and adhered to the 
principles of free trade. The process that led to the foundation 
of the European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1957 was not 
exactly what the United States had wished for, but the benefits 
of a politically united and capitalist Western Europe outweighed 
the costs of a customs union, which was but a second-best solu-
tion for the White House because of the trade-diverting effects. 
Making the customs union work was a painstaking process for the 
EEC member states that bound much diplomatic resources in the 
late 1950s and 1960s. In particular, France, keen to improve the 
trade balance by exporting agricultural surpluses to her neigh-
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bors, made clear that some form of a common European agricul-
tural policy was a necessary prerequisite for a European customs 
union, a project favored by Germany and its export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, given the weight of agriculture in 
the EU6-economies in the 1950s (on average 11 per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1955-596), the perspective of large 
intra-EEC agricultural trade flows and the quite different na-
tional regimes of agricultural support, a harmonization of agri-
cultural policies was inevitable. 
 
In postwar Europe two agricultural subsidization regimes 
were in practice which relied either on direct payments (direct 
income support) or on market protection to raise the domestic 
price level artificially high (indirect income support). As 
Great Britain had exposed its agriculture to the competitive 
forces of the world market since the abolition of the corn laws 
in the 1840s, its agricultural sector was very small (1955-59: 4 
per cent of GDP). Consumers profited from low food prices close 
to the world market level and the few remaining British farmers 
received tax-financed direct payments.7  
 
In the other European countries, and especially in the 
countries that were to form the EEC in 1957, the situation was 
different. Domestic farmers had been protected by tariff barri-
ers since the last quarter of the 19th century when the grain 
invasion from more efficient overseas producers had set in.8 
Moreover, since the inter-war period many states had introduced 
quantity restrictions for imports.9 These protective measures 
slowed down structural change and so the farm sectors were char-
acterized by numerous and often very small farms, many of which 
would not survive in competitive markets. A customs union, even 
if it protected EU farmers as a whole from outward competition, 
would imply that comparably efficient agricultural producers 
like those in France or the Netherlands would expand at the cost 
of the less efficient ones in Italy or Germany. Direct income 
support as practiced in Great Britain would have been very 
costly, difficult to implement on a supranational scale (espe-
cially in Italy with its many small farms) and would have faced 
opposition because it would have openly demonstrated that farm-
                                                 
6  Calculated from B.R. MITCHELL, International historical statistics: 
Europe 1750-2005, 6th ed., Palgrave/Macmillan, Basingstoke et al., 2007, pp. 
1036-1039. 
7  More in A.S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Routledge, 
London, 1992, pp. 253-254; and T. JOSLING, Western Europe, in: K. ANDERSON 
(ed.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspective, 1955-
2007, Palgrave/Macmillan - World Bank, London/Washington DC, 2009, pp. 115-
176, here p. 126. Agricultural shares from MITCHELL, op. cit., pp. 1037 and 
1041. 
8  See the classic study of K.H. O'ROURKE and J.G. WILLIAMSON, Globalization 
and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy, MIT 
Press, Cambidge/Mass., 1999, chs. 3 & 6. 
9  FEDERICO, Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800-
2000, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford, 2005, pp. 191-196. 
 4
ers could no longer earn their living on their own but rather 
were on welfare.10 
 
The solution finally chosen in January 1962 followed the 
traditional pattern of continental European agricultural policy 
support. The CAP foresaw a system of politically determined 
minimum prices which shielded less efficient producers from 
price competition of more efficient producers either from coun-
tries inside the customs union or outside. The produce of the 
latter was made dearer by import levies which varied according 
to the difference of the guaranteed minimum price and the world 
price. Intra-EEC competition in the agricultural sector was 
dampened by a system of border levies ('transitional compensa-
tory amounts') which were to be phased out once the level of 
EEC-wide common prices was specified.11  
 
Using price policy to conduct income policy was the origi-
nal sin of the CAP. When the Council of Ministers chose this op-
tion in early 1962 there could be no doubt on the consequences. 
Already in 1958 the so-called Haberler Report, an expertise for 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by a commis-
sion led by the Harvard economist Gottfried Haberler, had 
clearly analyzed the consequences of such a policy. If a pro-
ducer knows that all his output will sell at a guaranteed mini-
mum price, he will expand production until his marginal costs 
equal the guarantee price.12 The European Commission was also 
well aware of this simple economic logic.13  
 
Given the principal decision for common minimum prices, the 
decisive question was of course their level. Countries with less 
efficient producers like Italy and in particular Germany argued 
for high prices whereas France feared their inflationary conse-
quences for the consumers (and voters). After a long negotiation 
process in which Germany assumed the role of a veto player, the 
EU6 states opted for a quite high price level in December 1964.14 
This enabled many German farms to survive and brought French 
farmers decent profits. The bill was paid by taxpayers and con-
sumers who were not in the position to form powerful lobby 
                                                 
10  R. FENNELL, The Common Agricultural Policy: Continuity and Change, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, pp. 101-102; A.-C. L. KNUDSEN, Farmers on Welfare: 
The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 2009, pp. 232-251. 
11  B.E. HILL, The Common Agricultural Policy: Past, present and future, 
Methuen, London, 1984, pp. 22-23. 
12  GATT, Trends in international trade: report by a panel of experts, GATT, 
Geneva, 1958, pp. 82 and 87-102. 
13  Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Erster Gesamtbericht über die 
Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft, [Brussels], 1958, pp. 74-75. 
14  PATEL, Veto player no. 1? Germany and the creation of the EEC's Common 
Agricultural Policy, 1957-1964, in: M. GEHLER (ed.), From Common Market to 
European Union Building. 50 years of the Rome Treaties 1957-2007, Böhlau, 
Vienna, 2009, pp. 349-370; KNUDSEN, op. cit., pp. 260-265; C. GERMOND, The 
agricultural bone of contention: the Franco-German tandem and the making of 
the CAP, in: Journal of European Integration History (forthcoming 2010). 
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groups able to influence the negotiations in the way the pro-
ducer lobbies did. 
 
Already before the introduction of common prices on July 1, 
1967, European farmers proved that they understood the economic 
logic laid out in the Haberler Report. Once the first EEC-wide 
market regulations became effective in July 1962, agricultural 
production in the EU6 states grew strongly, leading to excess 
supplies which were either stored, destroyed or dumped on the 
world market. Butter mountains, milk and wine lakes, etc. sym-
bolized the flawed policies of the CAP already in the mid-
1960s.15 
 
As early as 1969 the EEC had to give up the idea of a com-
mon price, one of the fundamental pillars of the original pol-
icy. Following a revaluation of the German mark and a devalua-
tion of the French franc, the European Commission introduced the 
'monetary compensatory amount' (MCA). As the devaluation made 
French farmers more competitive, they had to pay MCAs when they 
exported to other EEC member countries. In contrast, German 
farmers exporting to other member countries received MCAs so as 
to not have their competitive position deteriorated. As a conse-
quence, considerable national price differences re-emerged in 
the supposedly 'common market', so that the introduction of the 
MCAs has often been interpreted as a renationalization of agri-
cultural price policies.16 Later a 'switch-over' mechanism was 
introduced which relieved the farmers in the devaluing country 
while leaving the farmers in other countries eligible for MCAs. 
This contributed to further price increases.17 
 
It did not necessarily require the expertise of economists 
to realize the perverse incentives of the price guarantee sys-
tem. Yet once on its path, reforming the CAP proved to be ex-
tremely difficult.18 An important factor for reform was not so 
much economic insight but rather the need to avert budget cri-
ses. In fact, the CAP proved to be so expensive and the ensuing 
political deadlocks so intricate that at times the whole Euro-
pean project was called into question. The internal push for re-
form was intensified by external pressure on the EU. Its protec-
tion of European agricultural markets was a constant stumbling 
block in international trade rounds within the GATT and WTO 
framework (Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay, Doha rounds) and undermined 
the credibility of the EU.19 
                                                 
15  See, e.g., Der Butterberg, in: Der Volkswirt, 9 July 1965. 
16  E. RIEGER, The Common Agricultural Policy: External and internal 
dimensions, in: H. WALLACE and W. WALLACE (eds.), Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 97-123.  
17  M.F. HOFREITHER, Origins and development of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, in: GEHLER, op. cit., pp. 333-348. 
18  A. KAY, Path dependency and the CAP, in: Journal of European Public 
Policy, 10(2003), pp. 405-420. 
19  T.E. JOSLING, S. TANGERMANN, and T.K. WARLEY, Agriculture in the GATT, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996; L. COPPOLARO, The Six, agriculture, and GATT: 
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The European Commission drafted numerous reform proposals, 
but as the system of guaranteed prices was successfully defended 
by its beneficiaries the underlying problem was not approached.20 
Instead of tackling it from the price side those proposals that 
were put into practice introduced quantity limits (the milk quo-
ta 1984, 'producer co-responsibility', etc.). Only the reform 
package of 1992, named after the then commissioner for agricul-
ture, Ray MacSharry, decoupled income policy from price policy 
in the cereal sector. Prices were reduced and farmers were com-
pensated by direct payments, a quite similar system to the pol-
icy regime operative in Great Britain prior to adhesion to the 
European Community in 1973.21 
 
 
2. Methodology: Assessing the Protective Effects of the CAP  
 
In the postwar trade rounds the agricultural protectionism of 
the EU, as well as that of other exporters of agricultural goods 
like the United States, proved to be a constant hurdle. Not only 
was it difficult to reconcile conflicting interests, but the 
data situation was unsatisfactory. Hence the OECD Ministerial 
Council decided in 1982 to monitor the agricultural sector 
closer than before. The OECD Secretariat chose the concept of 
the 'producer subsidy equivalent' (PSE), predecessors of which 
had been developed by trade economists in the 1960s to measure 
the economic effects of current practices of agricultural 
protection and support. The notion of the PSE had been developed 
by Tim Josling in the early 1970s who refined the concept and 
used it in his work for the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO).22 In 1999 the concept of the PSE underwent several 
conceptual changes and was renamed 'producer support estimate', 
apparently to remove normative connotations. Further minor 
changes were added in 2007.23  
                                                                                                                                                            
an international history of the CAP negotiations, 1958-1967, in: PATEL (ed.), 
op. cit., pp. 201-219. 
20 See, e.g., K. SEIDEL, Taking farmers off welfare. The EEC Commission's 
memorandum "Agriculture 1980" of 1968, in: Journal of European Integration 
History (forthcoming 2010). 
21  The institutional history of the CAP has been subject of several studies 
mostly written by political scientists, see KAY, The Reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy: The Case of the MacSharry Reforms, CABI Publ., 
Wallingford, 1998; E. FOUILLEUX, La Politique agricole commune et ses 
réformes: une politique à l'épreuve de la globalisation, L’Harmattan, Paris, 
2003; I. GARZON, Reforming the Common Agricultural Policy: History of a 
Paradigm Change, Palgrave/Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006. See for economically 
informed accounts HILL, op. cit., and FENNELL, op. cit. 
22  T.E. JOSLING, Agricultural Protection and Stabilization Policies: A 
Framework of Measurement in the Context of Agricultural Adjustment, 
c/75/LIM/2, FAO, Rome, 1975. 
23  OECD, OECD’s Producer Support Estimate and Related Indicators of 
Agricultural Support: Concepts, Calculations, Interpretation and Use (The 
PSE-Manual), OECD, Paris, 2008 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/31/41121738. 
pdf), pp. 25-27. 
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As the share of agriculture in developed countries' GDP 
continues to shrink, agricultural protection and support has be-
come less of a problem. For the less developed countries (LDCs), 
however, it remains high on the agenda of economic reform. So, 
for similar reasons as the OECD 25 years before, the World Bank 
built up a large database to measure agricultural protection in 
LDCs. Fortunately, from this paper's point of view, this data-
base includes most developed countries as well, in fact it 
builds directly on the data collected by the OECD. In contrast 
to the OECD, which treats the EU as a single political unit, the 
World Bank data relate to individual EU member countries and 
stretch back to 1956. Table 1 summarizes the main characteris-
tics of both databases. 
 
Table 1 OECD and World Bank Agricultural Protection Databases 
 OECD old OECD new World Bank
Period covered 1979-1998 1986-2008 1956-2007
EU coverage EU as a unit EU as a unit individual EU12 states except BE, GR, LU
Measurement con-
cepts  CSE*, PSE*, NAC CSE, PSE, TSE, NAC NRA
Notes: BE, GR, LU – Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg; CSE/PSE/TSE – consumer/ 
producer/total support estimate (* consumer/producer subsidy equiva-
lent); NAC – nominal assistance coefficient; NRA – nominal rate of as-
sistance. 
Sources: OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade. Monitoring and Out-
look, OECD, Paris, 1988; idem, Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
OECD Database 1986-2007, OECD, Paris, 2008, henceforth, referred to as 
OECD (2008) (www.oecd.org/tad/support/psecse); K. ANDERSON and E. 
VALENZUELA, Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 1955 
to 2007, spreadsheet at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions, World Bank, 
Washington DC, October 2008. 
 
A crucial variable in the OECD framework and the most important 
component of the producer support estimate (PSE) is market price 
support (MPS), which is defined as   
 
"the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and tax-
payers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, 
arising from policy measures that support agriculture by creating a gap 
between domestic market prices and border prices of specific agricul-
tural commodities”.24 
 
                                                 
24  OECD (2008), p. 57. Prices at "farm gate level" or "border prices" 
correspond to domestic prices and world prices, respectively. The economic 
concepts behind acronyms like PSE, NAC or NRA are derived from welfare and 
trade economics. In this paper, we will not go into the details. Basically, 
the OECD and the World Bank undertake a classical partial-analytical 
exercise. For a deeper analysis, see ibid. 
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Basically, the MPS for a commodity is determined by adding to-
gether transfers to producers from consumers and taxpayers, 
which empirically corresponds to the quantity of domestic pro-
duction multiplied by the difference between domestic market 
price and world price. In other words, MPS measures indirect 
support via price policies, i.e. protection. 
 
The PSE is a broader measurement concept and also includes 
direct subsidies, i.e. support. It is defined as  
 
"the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and tax-
payers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, 
arising from policies that support agriculture, regardless of their na-
ture, objectives or impacts on farm production or income”.25  
 
The PSE for a country c is calculated by adding together MPSi 
for all commodities i and adding the aggregate Budgetary and 
Other Transfers to producers from policies (BOT).  
 
Like the MPS, the PSE is a figure expressed in currency 
units. For international comparisons the OECD recommends non-
dimensional measures like the Percentage PSE (%PSE) and the Pro-
ducer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC). In order to calcu-
late %PSE, PSE is related to the value of Gross Farm Receipts 
(GFR), which is the sum of the Value of Production (VP) at do-
mestic prices and BOT. Note that market protection and support 
policies may inflate VP by lifting domestic prices over world 
prices and/or may result in paying direct subsidies (BOT). In 
the absence of any subsidies or protectionist policies, BOT = 0 
and PSE = 0, and so GFR = VP = domestic production valued at 
world prices (or, in this case equivalent, at domestic prices) 
and %PSE = 0. 
 
(1) 100*100*%
c
c
cc
c
c GFR
PSE
BOTVP
PSEPSE =+= 
The producer NAC is just a transformation of %PSE. It is deter-
mined by dividing the value of gross farm receipts by the value 
of production at world prices, which is the value of production 
at domestic prices less market price support: 
(2) 
 
The Agricultural Distortions Project of the World Bank bases its 
measures on the same conceptual framework as the OECD. For its 
database the World Bank has chosen the Nominal Rate of Assis-
tance (NRA), which is NAC minus unity.26 In the absence of any 
assistance (subsidies or price-distorting policies) PSE is zero, 
NAC equals unity and NRA equals zero. As we find NAC slightly 
                                                 
25  Ibid., p. 107, emphasis added by author. 
26  Ibid., p. 171. 
c
c
cc
c
c PSE
PSE
MPSVP
GFR
%100
%
1 −+=−=NAC
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more intuitive than NRA, we will rely on this measure for inter-
national and intertemporal comparisons of agricultural protec-
tion and support.  
 
 Before moving into the following section, the reader should 
note that the PSE and NAC values so-far discussed underestimate 
the true figures of protection and support for at least two rea-
sons. First, not all direct support measures on national and 
subnational levels are included, in particular prior to 1986, 
and second, the 'welfare loss triangles' (consumer demand 
crowded out and inefficient resource allocation) are not ac-
counted for. However, both effects are probably not large, and 
their exclusion certainly does not change the overall picture. 
Note also that the economic costs we are about to discuss are 
different from the welfare costs in a typical welfare economic 
exercise. The main difference is that a large part of the eco-
nomic costs are transfers to the farmers. While an analysis of 
the welfare costs might be interpreted as a net concept, our fo-
cus on the economic costs is a gross concept. 
 
 
3. Results: Agricultural Protection and Support in the European 
Union  
 
We are now able to calculate the economic costs of the CAP and 
compare them to the fiscal costs. The fiscal costs are published 
in the EU budget and include expenditure for price guarantees 
(EAGGF Guarantee Section) and expenditure for structural meas-
ures (EAGGF Guidance Section). They are borne by the taxpayers 
and are plotted as red line in Figure 1 (in million of euro, 
left-hand scale). 
 
The economic costs are measured by the PSE concept using 
the OECD/World Bank data. In addition to the fiscal costs borne 
by the taxpayers, they also include those borne by the consumers 
who pay politically influenced prices for food directly or indi-
rectly (if processed) subject to CAP regulation rather than 
(usually lower) world prices. As the World Bank's agricultural 
protection database does not include Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Greece we estimated the PSE for the EU6, EU9 and EU10 by adding 
up PSE for all other member countries and add a fictitious PSE 
for Belgium and Luxembourg (90 per cent of the Dutch PSE) and 
for Greece (14 per cent of the Italian PSE).27 From 1986 onwards, 
we rely directly on the OECD's PSE data for the EU as a whole.28 
                                                 
27  The results are very similar if we assume that the combined PSE of 
Belgium and Luxembourg is equal to that of the weighted average of the other 
EU member states. 
28  We proceed as follows (variables taken from the World Bank database are 
in lower case letters): NAC = nra_totd + 1, VP = vop_tot * NAC (in order to 
correct for the difference between domestic and world market prices) and BOT 
= nps. In order to check whether this interpretation of the World Bank 
database corresponds to equation (2) we compared the PSE figures calculated 
by this method from the World Bank database with the OECD's figures for 
 10
The original PSE data are in US dollar. As our focus here is on 
the burden borne by taxpayers and consumers of the EU, the in-
terpretation should not be blurred by the fluctuations of the US 
dollar. Hence we chose the European unit of account, Ecu and 
Euro as 'currency' (which, in the strict sense, it is only since 
1999) for the comparison and converted the PSE data accord-
ingly.29 The economic costs are plotted as green line (in million 
of euro, left-hand scale). The time axis stops in 2003, just be-
fore the enlargement to 25 member states which became effective 
on January 1, 2004.  
 
Figure 1 Fiscal and Economic Costs of the CAP in current 
prices, 1956-2003  
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Note: PSE values until 1985 represent the sum of respective EU member states, 
while 1986-2003 values correspond to OECD data for the EU as a whole. 
Sources: EU budget data from European Commission, op. cit., pp. 51-57; PSE 
data from 1956-1985 ANDERSON and VALENZUELA, op. cit.; 1986-2003 OECD 
Database (www.oecd.org/tad/support/psecse).  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the 
US for 1986 to 2007. The correlation coefficient is 0.986. 
29  In December 1952 the European Community for Steel and Coal created a 
parity unity of account (UA) for their budget, which was taken over by the 
European Communities. Initially the UA equaled one US$. When the Bretton 
Woods system broke down in 1971 and currencies floated, the EC pegged the UA 
to the gold value that the US$ had had between 1934 and 1971. The UA was 
replaced by the Ecu in March 1979, which in turn gave way to the Euro in 
January 1999. The exchange rate between the UA and the US$ was 1 until August 
1971. The rates since 1971 are taken from Eurostat, table ert_bil_eur_a. 
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Figure 1 clearly shows that the fiscal costs published by the EU 
are but a small fraction of total economic costs as measured in 
the OECD/World Bank framework. The dashed black line is the ra-
tio of the fiscal costs to the economic costs (right-hand 
scale). From 1970, three years after the CAP had come into full 
effect, until the mid-1980s this ratio amounted to between 15 
and 20 per cent on average, with a slightly rising trend. Since 
the mid-1980s it has risen quickly to about 45 per cent indicat-
ing that the EU's agricultural support policies became on aggre-
gate much more transparent than before (the fiscal costs borne 
by the taxpayers are visible in the EU budget, the additional 
costs of the consumers are not).  
 
Figure 2 Fiscal and Economic Costs of the CAP in prices of 
2000, 1956-2003  
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Notes and sources: same as in Figure 1. Data deflated with a EUx index con-
structed from OECD consumer price indices for the member countries, see 
footnote 31.   
 
Both the budget and the PSE series displayed in Figure 1 are in 
nominal terms and are thus inflated by the hefty price increases 
of the 1970s. Although public debates relate to nominal terms, 
it is more interesting in the long perspective taken here to ac-
count for the effects of inflation (Figure 2). The method of de-
flating the fiscal cost and economic cost series is not obvious. 
As the CAP undoubtedly contributed to the increase of agricul-
tural producer prices, this series is not an adequate deflator. 
From this reasoning it would be optimal to use an adjusted con-
sumer price index net of agricultural prices. Such an index, 
however, is not available for the whole period under discus-
 12
sion.30 Hence for deflating the series we used the common con-
sumer price index provided by the OECD.31  
 
The MacSharry reform came into effect only in the harvest 
year 1993/94 and was completed by 1996.32 Both from Figures 1 (in 
nominal terms) and 2 (in real terms) it becomes clear that the 
reform had at best a dampening effect on the fiscal costs. Yet 
this is not too surprising given its construction (see below).33 
More interesting are the economic costs. In nominal terms they 
stagnate since the mid-1980s whereas they fall quite considera-
bly in real terms inspite of two accession rounds and although 
agricultural prices did not fall on average.34 From an economic 
point of view, the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s seem to have 
had more impact on the protective effects of the CAP than the 
MacSharry reform. 
 
We now take a closer look at the effects of starting the 
CAP and acceding to the EU. As outlined in section 2, the pro-
ducer NAC is determined by dividing the (actual) value of gross 
farm receipts by the (hypothetical) value of production at world 
prices. If agriculture is neither protected nor supported, there 
is no difference between domestic prices and world prices so 
that MPS = 0, there are no subsidies BOT, hence VP = GFR, the 
numerator will equal the denominator, and NAC equals unity. If 
agriculture receives direct support or indirect support (protec-
tion) the value of gross farm receipts is inflated by subsidies 
paid out directly (BOT > 0) or by artificially high prices (MPS 
> 0), and NAC will rise above unity. A NAC of 1.5, for example, 
means that direct and indirect support equal half of the total 
value of production measured at world prices. If it is below 
unity, agriculture finances other sectors of the economy, for 
example if agricultural exports are taxed as was often the case 
in Mediterranean countries before they joined the European Un-
ion.  
 
Figures 3 to 5 show the NAC for four of the original six 
EEC member states and the countries that acceded to the EU in 
1973 and 1986 respectively. In respect to the 1992 MacSharry re-
                                                 
30  The OECD calculates a consumer price index net of food and energy prices. 
This index, however, is only for a few EU countries available for the whole 
period under consideration, see the tables in SourceOECD (http://lysander. 
sourceoecd.org/). 
31  We used the OECD's data for the annual change of the consumer price indi-
ces for the EU countries, constructed indices for the EU6, EU9, EU10, EU12 
and EU15 and chained them. The harmonized CPI index is not available for the 
whole period under consideration. The country weights are taken from the Eu-
roStat website [variable prc_hicp_cow] and are corrected for territorial 
changes (Germany 1990).  
32  FENNELL, op. cit., p. 172. 
33  See for more details R.W. ACKRILL et al., Member States and the Preferen-
tial Trade and Budget Effects of the 1992 CAP Reform: A Note, in: Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 48(1997), pp. 93-100. 
34  See the wheat prices in Figures 3 to 5 below and prices stored in the 
FAO’s price archive (http://faostat.fao.org). 
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form which was implemented between 1993 and 1996 the data show 
that the impact on overall levels of protection and support was 
negligible. The point of the reform was to decouple income pol-
icy from price policy. In order to get political consent, the 
volume of direct support was determined by historical income 
levels.35 Hence the share of agricultural support financed by the 
consumers decreased while that of taxpayers increased, so that 
the transparency of the policy increased as well. As Figures 3 
to 5 show this worked apparently quite smoothly, but with very 
little effect on trade distortions as measured by the NAC. In-
terestingly, like Figures 1 and 2 discussed above, Figures 3 and 
4 also suggest that the incremental reforms of the second half 
of the 1980s were more successful in driving the level of pro-
tection and support down than the 1992 reform.36 
 
Figure 3  Agricultural protection and support in four of the  
original six EEC states, 1956-2007 
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Note: Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are not available. 
Sources for Figures 3 to 5: NAC, Anderson and Valenzuela, op.cit.; US wheat 
prices, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser-
vice, Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook, Table 20 (http://www.ers. 
usda.gov/Data/Wheat/Yearbook/WheatYearbookTable20-Full.htm). Data for 
harvest years recalculated for calendar years and converted to UA/Ecu/ 
Euro according to the procedure described in footnote 29.  
 
                                                 
35  See also FEDERICO, op. cit., pp. 265-266, and ACKRILL et al., op. cit. 
36  See also C. ELTON, Paradigm Change within the CAP 1985-88: The European 
Commission's Construction of an Alternative Policy Narrative in the Late 
1980s, in: Journal of European Integration History (forthcoming 2010). 
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Figure 4  Agricultural protection and support in the states that 
acceded to the EEC in 1973, 1956-2007 
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Figure 5 Agricultural protection and support in the states that  
acceded to the EEC in 1986, 1956-2007 
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Trying to answer the question whether the EU's CAP was simply a 
continuation of national agricultural protection and support on 
a European level leads to astonishingly clear results. Figure 3 
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suggests that pre-CAP assistance levels fluctuated between 1.1 
in Italy and 1.6 in Germany (see appendix for details). In July 
1962 the markets for cereals, pig-meat, poultry and eggs became 
subject to the new market regulations, which consisted of target 
prices for domestic producers, equalization border levies on in-
tra-EEC trade, variable import levies on exports from third 
countries and compensatory payments for exports at low prices. 
This raised the price level in the EEC and made imports less at-
tractive, so that during the second half of 1962 imports of 
regulated products from countries outside the EEC fell "drasti-
cally", as the United Nations noted.37 Indeed, in all four states 
the level of assistance increased enormously to between 1.5 in 
Italy and more than 2 in Germany and the Netherlands.38 The un-
spectacular development of US wheat prices (as a proxy for world 
prices) between the mid-1950s and 1972 confirms that there were 
no drastic price changes that might have affected the NAC (this 
is also confirmed by the stable NAC values in other European 
countries around 1962 in Figures 4 and 5). Note that wheat 
prices are converted to UA/Ecu/Euro to control for fluctuations 
of the US dollar. 
 
The sharp decrease of the NAC in the years between 1973 and 
1975 is a reflection of the world food crisis which led to a 
price spike on the international cereals markets. As world pric-
es approached and even surpassed the high European guarantee 
prices, MPS decreases, and so the denominator of the NAC (VP – 
MPS) increases, indicating a decline of protection, which proved 
to be temporary, however. In these years the CAP worked the 
other way round and penalized European farmers who wished to ex-
port their produce, so that prices in the EEC remained compara-
bly stable. As inflation rates were high in these years, this 
policy was interpreted as a success of the CAP.39 
 
The high wheat prices during the world food crisis and a 
five year transition period obscure the full impact of joining 
the EEC and its CAP for the agricultural sectors of Denmark, 
Ireland and Great Britain (Figure 4). But already in 1975 the 
NAC was much higher than in the years preceding the accession, 
and for Denmark and Ireland were even higher than in any year 
since 1956. For the agricultural sectors of Portugal and Spain 
the accession was a welcome gift as well (Figure 5). In both 
countries pre-CAP protection levels were very low or even nega-
tive (Spain's NAC < 1), then jumped immediately after accession 
in 1986 and remained on levels far higher than before. The 1986 
spike, however, is partly due to a fall in world prices in that 
year. In the course of a seven to ten year transition period, 
                                                 
37  United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe, 15(1963), no. 1, p. 22. 
38  See also JOSLING, op. cit., pp. 128-129. 
39  C. GERLACH, The EEC in the World Food Crisis, 1972-1975, in: PATEL, op. 
cit., pp. 241-256. 
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the Iberian agricultural sectors were allowed to adapt slowly to 
the common tariff system and the CAP.40  
 
 
4. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
Given the evidence presented in the previous section there 
should remain no doubt that the economic effect of the CAP was 
more than simply a Europeanization of traditional national poli-
cies. One may insist that, in a very wide sense, the set of pol-
icy instruments did not change much. But the economic outcome of 
the policy chosen, i.e. the level of agricultural protection and 
support, was markedly shifted upwards. This was by no means in-
evitable. The fact alone that in 1993 the CAP introduced the 
system of direct payments that Britain had been required to ab-
andon when it joined the EEC in 1973 demonstrates that there had 
been an alternative to the path actually chosen.41  
 
The path chosen was extremely expensive. For all states 
analyzed here, the four of the original EU6 as well as the new 
members joining in 1973 and 1986, the CAP was an effective 
shield against world markets. Assistance levels usually jumped 
by 0.5 points, that is up to half of the total value of produc-
tion measured at world prices. Under the CAP, the level of EU 
agricultural protection and support continued to increase until 
the mid-1980s, disrupted only by the world food crisis of 1973-
75. Since the late 1980s protection levels have declined. As ce-
real prices fluctuated around a constant trend between 1975 and 
2005 this decline was probably the result of incremental changes 
before the MacSharry reform of 1992, a hypothesis which needs 
further elaboration 
 
It is certainly true, as Knudsen has forcefully argued, 
that the CAP must be interpreted as a welfare policy for the 
farming population.42 But this should not be interpreted as an 
inevitable feature of the emergence of the European welfare 
state. The NAC data for other European countries that also de-
                                                 
40  On the transition periods see F. GRANELL, Les périodes transitoires des 
différents élargissements de la Communauté Européenne, in: Revue du Marché 
Commun, 294(1986), pp. 95-100 and J. BADOSA PAGES, La adhesión de España a la 
CEE, in: Información Comercial Española, 826(2005), pp. 99-106, here pp. 103-
104. 
41  In Germany, the British model was discussed in the business press and in 
the public since at least 1958, see F. WALTERMANN, Verbraucher zahlen die 
EWG-Zeche, in: Der Volkswirt, 27 July 1962, pp. 1574-1577. The Commission 
discussed this alternative in 1963, see Commission de la Communauté 
Économique Européenne, Mesures en vue de l'établissement d'un niveau commun 
des prix des céréales, VI/COM(63)430 final (le 20 novembre 1963). 
42  Knudsen, op.cit.; see also A.D. SHEINGATE, The Rise of the Agricultural 
Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, 
France, and Japan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, and E. 
RIEGER, Agricultural Policy: Constrained Reforms, in: H. WALLACE, W. WALLACE, 
and M. POLLACK (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 161-190, here p. 166. 
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veloped the welfare state and were not at the time member states 
of the EU do not necessarily follow such a trend, as Table 2 
shows. In the mid-1980s, only Norway and Switzerland, countries 
whose agricultural sectors would certainly qualify as "less-
favored areas" in the CAP nomenclature, had higher assistance 
levels than the EU on average. Moreover, apart from Norway only 
Japan expanded its assistance to agriculture between the mid-
1950s and the mid-1980s on a similar scale to the EU. The assis-
tance levels of the agricultural sectors in Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and even Switzerland grew pronouncedly less than in the 
EU, while those of Austria and Finland even decreased. 
Table 2 Nominal Assistance Coefficient for European Countries 
and Japan, 1956-58 to 1983-85 
 1956-58 1963-65 1970-72 1977-79 1983-85 1983-85  
vs. 1956-58
EU6 1.35 1.71 1.65 1.58 1.82 +35%
EU6/9 1.35 1.71 1.65 1.61 1.85 +37%
Austria 1.23 1.35 1.23 1.24 1.22 -1%
Finland 1.78 1.93 1.90 1.82 1.47 -18%
Norway 2.88 2.94 3.01 3.84 4.96 +72%
Portugal 0.94 1.03 1.10 1.25 1.09 +16%
Spain 1.12 1.07 1.06 0.94 1.16 +4%
Sweden 1.82 2.15 1.97 1.94 1.85 +2%
Switzerland 3.53 3.50 3.45 3.49 3.92 +11%
Japan 1.42 1.47 1.57 1.86 2.01 +42%
Notes: EU6 value-added-weighted average of NAC for France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands; EU9 the aforementioned plus, since 1973, Denmark, Ire-
land and the UK. 
Source: See appendix. 
 
If the CAP was a welfare policy, it was an extraordinary expen-
sive one, and its stunning resistance to reform suggests that 
the welfare argument brought forward by the contemporaries seems 
to have been more a useful rhetoric to mobilize urban agrarian 
romanticism for agro-industrialist interests than the full 
story, another hypothesis that needs further elaboration in fu-
ture research. 
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Appendix  
Nominal Assistance Coefficient for European Countries, 1956 to 
2003 
 FR GE IT NL DK IRL UK PT SP EU6 EU9 
1956 1.27 1.46 1.03 1.38 1.26 1.14 1.47 0.93 1.08 1.26  
1957 1.40 1.50 0.99 1.48 1.25 1.23 1.67 0.93 1.12 1.31  
1958 1.64 1.57 1.20 1.39 1.30 1.19 1.80 0.96 1.16 1.47  
1959 1.35 1.56 0.98 1.47 1.36 1.26 1.68 0.95 1.16 1.31  
1960 1.13 1.55 1.00 1.36 1.19 1.17 1.55 1.08 1.19 1.22  
1961 1.27 1.65 1.11 1.50 1.36 1.48 1.71 1.05 1.20 1.35  
1962 1.75 2.13 1.51 2.14 1.44 1.54 1.70 1.02 1.18 1.81  
1963 1.67 1.96 1.45 1.97 1.36 1.43 1.51 1.03 1.09 1.71  
1964 1.62 1.88 1.44 1.90 1.29 1.41 1.50 1.01 1.03 1.66  
1965 1.68 2.02 1.49 2.06 1.34 1.50 1.49 1.05 1.09 1.75  
1966 1.67 1.98 1.47 2.01 1.37 1.44 1.49 1.04 1.08 1.72  
1967 1.68 1.93 1.45 2.00 1.37 1.47 1.43 1.07 1.08 1.70  
1968 1.76 2.03 1.52 2.08 1.40 1.58 1.39 1.08 1.17 1.79  
1969 1.72 1.99 1.47 2.04 1.39 1.45 1.33 1.09 1.15 1.75  
1970 1.57 1.88 1.40 1.95 1.32 1.39 1.27 1.07 1.06 1.64  
1971 1.68 1.91 1.48 2.06 1.40 1.43 1.32 1.11 1.13 1.72  
1972 1.55 1.73 1.42 1.94 1.32 1.28 1.27 1.12 1.01 1.59  
1973 1.22 1.39 1.16 1.60 1.46 1.66 1.41 1.02 0.86 1.28 1.31 
1974 1.15 1.26 1.12 1.45 1.33 1.40 1.32 1.12 0.83 1.19 1.21 
1975 1.35 1.48 1.24 1.67 1.55 1.59 1.52 1.25 1.00 1.38 1.40 
1976 1.48 1.82 1.37 2.13 1.79 2.02 1.74 1.20 0.98 1.60 1.63 
1977 1.48 1.64 1.37 1.90 1.79 1.83 1.67 1.22 0.92 1.52 1.55 
1978 1.55 1.63 1.38 1.80 1.80 1.84 1.66 1.27 0.94 1.54 1.57 
1979 1.67 1.81 1.50 1.95 1.99 1.92 1.82 1.27 0.94 1.68 1.71 
1980 1.60 1.65 1.47 1.80 1.72 1.75 1.66 1.24 0.85 1.59 1.60 
1981 1.73 1.88 1.59 2.05 1.86 2.00 1.79 1.17 0.88 1.76 1.77 
1982 1.82 1.96 1.71 2.17 1.88 2.12 1.89 1.11 0.98 1.86 1.87 
1983 1.92 2.18 1.72 2.37 2.15 2.65 2.11 1.11 1.14 1.97 2.00 
1984 1.72 1.87 1.64 2.07 1.78 2.43 1.81 1.11 1.13 1.77 1.79 
1985 1.70 1.83 1.59 1.95 1.73 2.53 1.89 1.06 1.23 1.72 1.76 
1986 2.09 2.14 1.76 2.06 2.14 2.75 2.25 1.58 1.75 2.00 2.05 
1987 2.13 2.03 1.77 1.90 2.05 2.68 2.24 1.59 1.77 1.98 2.02 
1988 1.80 1.79 1.60 1.75 1.80 2.05 1.90 1.57 1.64 1.73 1.76 
1989 1.51 1.49 1.39 1.46 1.46 1.70 1.58 1.35 1.39 1.47 1.48 
1990 1.67 1.62 1.48 1.53 1.58 1.91 1.75 1.35 1.45 1.59 1.61 
1991 1.90 1.83 1.58 1.65 1.74 2.10 1.92 1.46 1.57 1.76 1.78 
1992 1.69 1.65 1.52 1.58 1.51 1.89 1.76 1.47 1.48 1.62 1.63 
1993 1.72 1.74 1.58 1.69 1.66 1.85 1.77 1.52 1.57 1.68 1.69 
1994 1.65 1.68 1.54 1.64 1.63 1.83 1.73 1.50 1.55 1.63 1.64 
1995 1.58 1.60 1.51 1.60 1.54 1.77 1.66 1.47 1.51 1.56 1.57 
1996 1.46 1.51 1.42 1.56 1.44 1.67 1.52 1.40 1.40 1.47 1.48 
1997 1.50 1.55 1.46 1.60 1.46 1.79 1.54 1.42 1.41 1.51 1.52 
1998 1.61 1.69 1.49 1.69 1.63 1.95 1.69 1.43 1.50 1.60 1.62 
1999 1.67 1.79 1.53 1.79 1.79 2.02 1.78 1.49 1.56 1.67 1.70 
2000 1.51 1.57 1.43 1.60 1.54 1.76 1.56 1.42 1.42 1.51 1.52 
2001 1.46 1.48 1.41 1.51 1.45 1.70 1.52 1.39 1.41 1.46 1.47 
2002 1.51 1.58 1.46 1.62 1.53 1.87 1.60 1.44 1.44 1.53 1.54 
2003 1.57 1.62 1.49 1.67 1.57 1.91 1.63 1.48 1.49 1.57 1.58 
 19
 20
Notes: EU6 value-added-weighted average of NAC for France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands; EU9 the aforementioned plus, since 1973, Denmark, Ire-
land and the UK. 
Source: Calculated from ANDERSON and VALENZUELA, op. cit.; agricultural 
value-added shares 1975-79 from MITCHELL, op. cit., pp. 1036-1041; 1977 
GDP from OECD.StatExtracts (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx). 
 
